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A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON LIBERTARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
WALTER E. BLOCK* 
EDITOR’S NOTE 
Presented below are three articles authored or co-authored by Walter E. Block. 
They are as follows: 
I. SUNSHINE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS, WALTER E. BLOCK 
II. ALIENABILITY, ONCE AGAIN; A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF CONTRACTS, 
WALTER E. BLOCK 
III. PROFESSOR LEVY ON THE REAL BLACKMAIL PARADOX: A RESPONSE, 
WALTER E. BLOCK AND DAVID GORDON 
I.  SUNSHINE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ABSTRACT 
We attempt to demonstrate that while it should be against the law to interfere 
with any property owner from receiving sunlight from directly above, this 
should not at all apply to tall buildings, which place into shadow their 
neighbors, and thus deprive them of sideways sunlight. 
  
 
* Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics, Joseph A. Butt, 
S.J. College of Business, Loyola University New Orleans. 
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Who owns the rights to sunshine? 
Mr. Burns, of The Simpsons fame, once placed a gigantic umbrella over 
Springfield, so as to keep the denizens of this town in the dark and force them 
to purchase more electricity at higher prices from his nuclear power plant.1 Did 
he have a right to place his umbrella in such a manner? Absolutely not, we 
argue, as the townsfolk had long previously enjoyed the sun’s rays; they, in 
effect, were the homesteaders of it. Mr. Burns, in sharp contrast, was a Johnny-
come-lately, and therefore not the proper owner of this benefit, at least 
according to the libertarian theory of homesteading.2 
But suppose, instead, that Mr. Burns had built a very wide 500-story 
building right at the edge of town. While this, of course, would not directly 
interfere with the citizenry receiving sunlight from directly above, it most 
certainly would cast most if not all of them into shadow for at least part of the 
day. Moreover, they would have received this sideways sunlight before the 
advent of the building; so they were “there first” for indirect sunlight from the 
side, not only for direct rays from straight above. Nevertheless, we shall argue 
that Mr. Burns has a right to erect his building adjacent to the town, but not to 
place his umbrella directly over it. 
 
 1. The Simpsons, Who Shot Mr. Burns? (Part One) (FOX television broadcast May 21, 
1995). 
 2. See HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
332, 336 (1993); ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 8–9 (1987); 
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 47–48 (2d ed. 2006) (1973), available at 
http://www.mises.org/rothbard/newliberty.asp; Walter Block, Earning Happiness Through 
Homesteading Unowned Land: A Comment on “Buying Misery with Federal Land” by Richard 
Stroup, 15 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 235, 235 (1990); Walter Block, Homesteading City 
Streets: An Exercise in Managerial Theory, 5 PLAN. & MARKETS 18, 19 (2002), available at 
http://www-pam.usc.edu/volume5/v5i1a2s1.html; Walter Block, On Reparations to Blacks for 
Slavery, 3 HUM. RTS. REV. 53, 53 (2002); Walter Block & Guillermo Yeatts, The Economics and 
Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace’s “Toward a 
Better Distribution of Land: The Challenge of Agrarian Reform”, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 37, 43 (1999–2000); Walter Block & Richard Epstein, Debate on Eminent Domain, 1 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 1144, 1149 (2005); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and 
Public Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization, 3 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 1, 3 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and Public Property]; N. Stephan Kinsella, A 
Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability, 17 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11, 11 (2003); John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent 
and End of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 
1, 17–18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1960); Per Bylund, Man and Matter: A Philosophical Inquiry into 
the Justification of Ownership in Land from the Basis of Self-Ownership 1 (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://perbylund.com/academics_polsci_msc.pdf; Stephan Kinsella, 
How We Come to Own Ourselves, LUDWIG VON MISES INST. (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.mises. 
org/story/2291; Michael S. Rozeff, Original Appropriation and Its Critics, LEW ROCKWELL 
(Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.lewrockwell.com/rozeff/rozeff18.html. 
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Before we discuss our reasons for harping on what may appear to many 
people as merely a tempest over a television cartoon show, let us discuss why 
this issue is of any importance whatsoever. It is of crucial moment for 
determining whether or not eminent domain laws are needed to trump possible 
holdouts against the creation of private highways.3 For, suppose there was a 
holdout in the planned path of the thoroughfare; how could the private builder 
create the roadway without resort to the government? Simple: by building a 
tunnel under4 the holdout’s property or a bridge over it. However, the sunlight 
rights of the holdout, from above at least, must be respected. Therefore, the 
bridge must be made of translucent material.5 
To return to our main point of interest, if the bridge builder over the 
holdout’s land must respect the latter’s right to direct sunlight, why must Mr. 
Burns be legally allowed to put anyone else’s land in the shadows for part of 
the day, by juxtaposing a large dwelling next to it? 
In order to answer this, picture the earth not as it is, a sphere, but as a cube, 
of roughly the same size as at present. And, while we are at it, let us suppose 
that instead of the sun rising in the east and setting in the west, there are now 
six suns beaming down at our cubed earth, one for each of its surfaces.6 But 
they each rise on the east side of the one of the six surfaces of the earth to 
which they are assigned, and set in the west. Now, if we were to ban buildings 
from being erected that cast shadows on their neighbor’s territory, when the 
sun is very low in the sky in either direction, an edifice would place into 
relative darkness an area stretching the entire length and breadth of one sixth of 
the earth’s surface. And this applies, not only to tall buildings, but, indeed, to 
anything. Consider a person who is six feet tall. He, too, would cast a gigantic 
shadow over a gargantuan swath of land; he would be “violating” not only his 
neighbor’s rights to uninterrupted sunlight, but also that of people thousands of 
miles away! Suppose instead of standing up, he crawled around, and the top of 
him reached a height of only eighteen inches. He would still be a rights 
violator, since, assuming an exactly flat surface of the earth, when the sun was 
low enough in either direction, he would be casting a shadow the entire length 
 
 3. See WALTER BLOCK, THE PRIVATIZATION OF ROADS AND HIGHWAYS: HUMAN AND 
ECONOMIC FACTORS, at xv–xvii (2009), available at http://mises.org/books/roads_web.pdf. 
 4. We reject the ad coelum doctrine. According to this law, those who own a plot of land on 
the surface of the earth also have property rights in a decreasing share of territory below, or an 
increasing share above (think ice cream cone). But this doctrine is inconsistent with 
homesteading, as the typical landowner never mixed his labor with anything, say, 400 yards 
below his holdings, nor 40,000 feet above. The land below properly belongs to the first 
homesteader, which we presume will be the road builder. The right to utilize the air above is 
properly that of those who have first used it, namely the airline companies. 
 5. It must also have gaps in it, so as to allow the rain to reach the holdout’s crops below. 
 6. We further posit that each of these six suns is “on” for twelve hours of the day, and “off” 
for an equal amount of time. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
544 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:541 
of the planet.7 However, presumably, there were people walking around, on 
their two feet, long before anyone built any edifice at all. People came before 
buildings, not the other way around. Thus, the human beings all homesteaded 
the rights to stand straight up, let alone crawl around on their bellies. The 
logical implication of this is that these individuals first had a right to do 
exactly that. If so, in this cubic world we are now considering, they cast 
gigantic shadows all over the place. We thus conclude that no property owner 
has any right to object to someone else casting a shadow on him from a 
sideways direction. There is still ownership in the sun’s rays from directly 
overhead, but not from any other direction. 
Now, let us return to the real world. We are again occupying a sphere, not 
a cube. The sun is now back in its proper revolution around the earth.8 People 
do not cast quite the giant sized shadows they did in our other scenario, but 
they do block out the sun’s rays from the sideways direction over other 
people’s property. Since people came first, the homesteading philosophy 
accords them the right not only to crawl around, but also to walk about on their 
hind legs and, by extension, to erect edifices that cast shadows onto the 
property of other people. 
There is a problem, however. Note, that I am taking an ad coelum 
viewpoint with regard to sunlight. That is, I am claiming that the property 
owner has the right to continue to receive sunlight only from directly above, 
not from any sideways direction. However, I am on record9 critiquing this ad 
coelum perspective. I did so on the ground that it was incompatible with 
homesteading: no surface property owner, typically, mixed his labor with 
territory tens of thousands of feet below the surface of the earth—or above it, 
either, for that matter. 
Why the difference? Why accept ad coelum above ground, but not below? 
And, to make matters even worse, cannot a claim be made by the first 
landowner-farmer that he had homesteaded the sun’s rays for his crops not 
only from directly above, but also from the sideways directions for significant 
parts of the day? 
My attempted reconciliation is based on recognition of the fact that there is 
a conflict of rights in rejecting ad coelum from above, but not from below. 
Yes, the farmer has utilized the sun’s rays from all directions, not just directly 
above. But, in the flat world of our previous devising, this is incompatible with 
anyone else on earth so much as existing, let alone lying flat, and certainly not 
 
 7. Well, one-sixth of it in any case. 
 8. Do not tell me about Copernicus. I do not want to hear about this quack/charlatan. He 
was obviously wrong about what revolves around what. We are not interested in his silly theory. 
As any fool can see, the sun, rising in the east and setting in the west as it does every day, 
revolves around the earth, and not the other way around. 
 9. See BLOCK, supra note 3, at 296. 
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standing up. For, if anyone else does that, he blocks some of the sideways 
sunlight of our farmer. In the real world, which looks flat to the naked eye, 
when the sun is at its low point—either just rising or setting—a human being, 
say, six feet tall, casts a gigantic shadow. And this is to say nothing of a 
modest two- or three-story building, arguably necessary for human life. Thus, 
the farmer could in justice, if he were granted other than ad coelum sunlight 
rights, object to the existence of any other human being. But we take the 
existence of human beings, many of them, as a given. Certainly, the entire 
edifice of property rights is erected on the consideration that it is the only way 
to prevent conflict between members of our species. However, there cannot be 
conflict if there is only one person on the flat earth, or only a very, very few on 
our spherical planet. If the purpose of property rights is to prevent conflict,10 
and conflict can only take place between different people, then, if we want to 
adhere to a system of property rights, it logically cannot preclude the very 
existence of more than one individual. But sideways sunlight property rights 
do precisely that. They make it impossible for anyone else except the one 
homesteader to exist. Therefore, that doctrine must be rejected. 
If the farmer wants sideways property rights, he can homestead, say, 
10,000 acres, and thus obtain for himself, for example, an inner 1,000 acres, 
assuming de minimus rules for very tall buildings nearby. That is, the more 
sideways sunlight he wants to guarantee for himself, the more land the farmer 
must homestead. No one, perhaps, can protect himself from a building 500 
stories high, but at least at present, such heights are economically and 
architecturally unfeasible. 
What of noise pollution? How does this figure into the present 
discussion?11 There is a relevant difference between noise pollution, on the one 
hand, and sunlight on the other, so that the former is not directly related to our 
present considerations. How so? This is because sunlight is a benefit, while 
noise pollution is a harm or a rights violation—certainly if it exceeds certain 
norms. Consider the airport. The geographical limits of the homesteading for 
runways, buildings, and parking lots, we may suppose, is one square mile. But 
posit that the noise of its planes extends to cover nine square miles. The airport 
owner has not mixed his labor with surrounding territory in any way apart from 
perpetrating noise upon it. If the airport was there first, well and good: any 
homeowner who sets up shop later on any of the eight surrounding square 
miles has “[come] to the nuisance”12 and must take the land as he finds it 
(noisy, in this case). Of course, if the homeowner has first homesteaded land in 
 
 10. Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and Public Property, supra note 2, at 9. 
 11. I am indebted to Rabbi Lipa Dubrawsky for bringing up this point. 
 12. Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, 2 CATO J. 55 (1982), 
reprinted in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 234, 249 (Walter Block 
ed., 1990). 
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the area surrounding the soon-to-be-built airport, then the latter must purchase 
the noise rights from the former. But, in any case, noise is like a projectile, or a 
bullet, or dust particles; it constitutes an invasion against private property.13 
Another relevant difference between noise and sunlight is that the one is an act 
of God (or nature) while the other, apart from volcanoes, storms, etc., is 
manmade. 
What about water?14 Let us divide this challenge into two categories: rain 
and rivers. As far as the former is concerned, it is identical to sunlight. The 
farmer owns the precipitation that comes down from above, but not that which 
emanates from a sideways direction. So, if someone erects a large building 
nearby, which blocks the rain that would otherwise reach his crops from that 
quarter, the farmer should have no recourse at law to demand damages or an 
injunction. However, if someone wants to build a bridge overhead,15 he must 
do so in the form of a grid, so as to allow the rain to fall below.16 Why? For the 
same reasons as sunlight. Ad coelum is justified above but not below ground17 
for the sun’s rays, since otherwise, the existence of only one human being 
would be justified. Sideways ownership of rain, therefore, follows the same 
legal and logical pattern as sunlight. 
What of rivers? Suppose B has set up a watermill downstream, first. 
Whereupon A, located upstream, diverts the water, making already existing 
B’s factory inoperable. One possible answer stems from the concept of optimal 
size or “Technological Unit.” States Rothbard: 
If A uses a certain amount of a resource, how much of that resource is to 
accrue to his ownership? Our answer is that he owns the technological unit of 
the resource. The size of that unit depends on the type of good or resource in 
question, and must be determined by judges, juries, or arbitrators who are 
expert in the particular resource or industry in question. If resource X is owned 
by A, then A must own enough of it so as to include necessary appurtenances. 
For example, in the courts' determination of radio frequency ownership in the 
1920s, the extent of ownership depended on the technological unit of the radio 
wave—its width on the electromagnetic spectrum so that another wave would 
 
 13. Id. at 248. 
 14. I am indebted to Matthew A. Block for raising this point. 
 15. Walter Block & Matthew Block, Roads, Bridges, Sunlight, and Private Property Rights, 
7 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 351, 359 (1996); Walter Block, Roads, 
Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property: Reply to Gordon Tullock, 8 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES 
ETUDES HUMAINES 315, 319 (1998); BLOCK, supra note 3, at 307. 
 16. The construction materials must be translucent, so that the sun’s rays can reach the 
ground. 
 17. However, the ownership of air paths for airlines belongs to air carriers, not farmers. The 
former, not the latter, have homesteaded them. As to the objection that an airplane can block a 
farmer’s sunlight with its shadow, or block some rain from reaching below, this may be dismissed 
on de minimus grounds. In any case, most air travel nowadays occurs above the clouds, not below 
them. 
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not interfere with the signal, and its length over space. The ownership of the 
frequency then was determined by width, length, and location. 
  American land settlement is a history of grappling, often unsuccessfully, 
with the size of the homestead unit. Thus, the homesteading provision in the 
federal land law of 1861 provided a unit of 160 acres, the clearing and use of 
which over a certain term would convey ownership to the homesteader. 
Unfortunately, in a few years, when the dry prairie began to be settled, 160 
acres was much too low for any viable land use (generally ranching and 
grazing). As a result, very little Western land came into private ownership for 
several decades. The resulting overuse of the land caused the destruction of 
Western grass cover and much of the timberland.18 
In the river case, the point would be that B was not given ownership over 
enough of it to constitute the “technological unit.” Certainly, it is a “necessary 
appurtenance” of the water mill to ensure that the river is not diverted to a 
different path. If so, then B would be entitled, in law, to an injunction to 
prevent A from diverting the river’s waters from him. 
II.  ALIENABILITY, ONCE AGAIN; A LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF CONTRACTS 
ABSTRACT 
We should be free to sell ourselves into slavery, if we wish. We should be free 
to sign ourselves into rehabilitation centers, and not be allowed to leave until 
the agreed upon time, even if we change our minds. We should be free to bind 
ourselves to specific performance contracts, even if we wish to renege. These 
contracts should be enforced against us, on the supposition that we entered in 
to them voluntarily. We should be compelled to live up to the letter and spirit 
of all such contracts. The present paper makes the case for these somewhat 
remarkable claims on both utilitarian and deontological grounds. 
A. Introduction 
The doctrine of alienability means that a person may sell, give away, or 
otherwise dispose of a possession.19 For example, shoes, books, and cars are 
alienable.20 The law does not prohibit us from ridding ourselves of these 
objects; we may sell or give them away, and for “keeps.” That is, once they are 
alienated in such a manner, we are precluded by law from seeking back their 
possession once again against the will of their present owners.21 
In some jurisdictions, sexual services and used body parts (such as 
kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, and blood) may be donated to others but not sold 
 
 18. Rothbard, supra note 12, at 153–54. 
 19. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1854 (1987). 
 20. That is, there are no laws prohibiting the sale of mundane objects such as these. 
 21. Once a sale takes place, it is a permanent one, unless both parties change their minds. A 
buys a car from B for $10,000. Once the sale is finalized, B may not take back the automobile, 
nor A the money, unless by mutual consent. 
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to them for pecuniary considerations.22 Thus, they are legally alienable for free 
but inalienable for money. 
Inalienability is the opposite. Here, a good, service, benefit, or whatever, 
may not legally be disposed of. The U.S. Declaration of Independence, for 
example, declares: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”23 
This Article attempts to demonstrate that this doctrine is a malicious one, 
incompatible with a more correct libertarian theory of contracts. We do so by 
use of three examples. In Part B we consider the case of the alcoholic. The 
purpose of Part C is to analyze the example of the safety net. Voluntary slavery 
is the subject of Part D. We consider several objections in Part E and conclude 
in Part F. 
B. The Alcoholic 
A is an alcoholic. He has tried numerous cures for this debility. One that 
almost worked for him is a drying out program. This is an entirely closed 
facility that will provide room and board for him, but not a drop of alcohol. 
Previously, he had signed up for a six-month stint at such an establishment. 
But after only one month, he checked himself out; he could not tolerate being 
without his favorite beverage for a second longer. Would it be legal for A to 
sign himself in at such a facility for the entire six months24 with the agreement 
that he could not again renege on this cure? 
He could do so if he could legally alienate his will for that length of time. 
But the law as it stands25 does not allow any such thing. At time t1 he agrees to 
 
 22. This is a bit of a legal anomaly. A gift of such goods and services is within the law. 
Payment for them is prohibited by legislative enactment. This implies that there is something 
problematic about money changing hands, not these goods and services. But why should that be? 
Presumably, such legislation reflects an anti-market bias. See LUDWIG VON MISES, THE ANTI-
CAPITALIST MENTALITY (1956). 
 23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). I use “inalienable” and 
“unalienable” as synonyms. 
 24. After which, he believes he will be cured of what he regards as his affliction. 
 25. The Thirteenth Amendment actually prohibits even private slavery (unlike most aspects 
of the Constitution): “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend XIII. Debtor’s prison, sometimes called 
“peonage,” is also precluded by this amendment. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 108-17, at 1661 (2d Sess. 2004). This 
is a very clear statement of the legal situation: “[T]he Thirteenth Amendment is also not limited 
to regulating action undertaken by state governments, since it bans even purely private slavery 
and involuntary servitude.” Ilya Somin, The Scope of Federal Power Under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 13, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.volokh.com/ 
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be bound for the entire half-year period. But at time t2, after one month we 
may suppose, he will again change his mind. Present legislation will uphold his 
later decision, the one made at time t2, and will ignore his earlier one, the one 
made at the outset, at time t1. Were the establishment, such as the Betty Ford 
Center,26 to hold our man A against his will, one month after he signed himself 
in, they would be considered kidnappers. Thus, substance abuse centers are 
fighting alcoholism with the proverbial “one hand tied behind their back.” 
When the going gets rough for the alcoholic, he can reject the treatment, be let 
go, and resume his previous addictive habits. 
On the other hand, under the doctrine of alienability, not inalienability, the 
prognostication for Mr. A would be a better one. Assuming, arguendo, that the 
full six-month period of drying out would indeed cure him of his dependency, 
the clinic could indeed offer him this possibility. When he wants to check out 
after six months, the substance abuse emporium would point blank refuse. If 
Mr. A accuses them of kidnapping, the defendant in this case would have a 
signed statement from the complainant giving up his right to make any such 
charge. 
C. Safety Net 
Mr. B is a tightrope walker. He prances on a thin wire, perched 100 feet 
high in the air. If he falls to the ground, he will die. So he hires Mr. C to carry 
a safety net below him, and to move it so that it always remains directly below 
B. Then, if B stumbles, C will save him. But B is afraid that C will renege on 
the deal, and if he slips off the rope, he will perish. There are several 
considerations that make it unlikely that C will depart from this position of 
trust when B needs him most. First, reputation. If C does this, his reputation as 
a safety net holder will be reduced. Probably, he will never, ever land such a 
job again. Second, B could ask C to post a bond for a substantial amount of 
money. If the latter leaves the former hanging, so to speak, he would forfeit 
these funds. Third, B perhaps can rely upon the fact that if C deserts him, B’s 
heirs can sue C for damages. 
Despite all of these considerations, B is not fully content with them. He 
would like to offer C a different kind of contract: that if C leaves B in the 
lurch, B or one of B’s supporters may shoot C dead.27 This is in effect a 
 
2013/02/14/the-scope-of-federal-power-under-the-thirteenth-amendment/. I owe this footnote to 
Stephan Kinsella. 
 26. THE BETTY FORD CENTER, http://www.bettyfordcenter.org/index.php (last visited Sept. 
13, 2013). 
 27. This is similar to what the armed forces do with deserters: hang them or utilize the firing 
squad. 
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specific performance contract.28 Most likely, B will have to pay C more than 
would otherwise be the case, given the enhanced risk undertaken by the latter. 
The doctrine of inalienability would rule such a contract per se invalid. On 
utilitarian grounds, the loss would be that we would have fewer tightrope 
walkers than would otherwise be the case. Certain contracts between 
consenting adults will not be supported by law. On deontological 
considerations, people shall be precluded from using their freedom exactly as 
they wish. 
D. Voluntary Slavery 
Mr. D has a son, E. The son has a grave life-threatening disease. It will 
cost five million dollars to cure E. D, a poor man, has nowhere anything like 
that amount of money. Mr. F, a rich man, has long wished he could have D as 
his slave at his beck and call, so much so that he would be willing to purchase 
the rights to own D, were they but alienable. D, for his part, values his son’s 
(E’s) life more than he does his own liberty. That is, a trade between D and F 
would be Pareto optimal. At least one person would gain in welfare, and no 
one would lose an iota of it. D would garner from this contract his son’s life 
(he would use the five million dollars for that purpose), which he values more 
than his freedom. He would profit to the extent of the difference between these 
two values. The same would apply to F. He rates D as a slave more highly than 
the five million dollars he must give up in order to make this purchase. His 
profit, too, is the difference to him between these two values. As with all 
voluntary commercial interactions, this is necessarily beneficial to both parties, 
at least in the ex ante sense. If this voluntary interaction is allowed to take 
place, D, all things considered, happily becomes a slave, E lives, and F takes 
on the role of slave master. All this, under alienability. But with inalienability 
the law of the land, D stays from much to his dismay because his child E 
perishes from this dreaded disease, and F is deprived of his dream to own 
another person. The latter’s discomfort will not weigh heavily to most men of 
good will. But these will have to pause, at least a bit, at the prospect of E 
dying, and D, his loving parent, being unable to save him at the cost of his own 
liberty. 
What would voluntary slavery mean in such a context? This much and no 
more: after the deal was consummated, F would be, let us suppose, allowed by 
law to whip (kill? It matters not) D.29 Suppose D were to protest such behavior 
 
 28. The law generally does not favor enforcing contracts by “specific performance,” so at 
most the defaulting slave would owe money damages. See 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 1 
(2013). I owe this point to Stephan Kinsella. See also JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR. & JOHN C. 
MANN, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCES OF CONTRACTS 683 (3d ed. 1926). 
 29. It goes without saying, but I will say it anyway, given that this is such an emotionally 
charged issue. Despite some superficial similarities, this system of voluntary slavery is very 
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on F’s part, even though it was a clear aspect of the slave contract that he 
signed.30 D resorts to the libertarian law against initiatory aggression. He calls 
the police and asks them to stop F from whipping or even killing him. What 
should the cops do? If they follow that law that allows for alienability, the 
forces of law and order would do exactly what they would do if F, instead of 
brutalizing D, were doing so to his cow or chicken—namely, nothing 
whatsoever. F would be operating well within the bounds of the law. That is 
exactly what is meant by voluntary slavery: if the slave agrees to take on this 
role, he cannot object when his master avails himself of rights thereto. Nor 
may the slave run away, for then he would be stealing a valuable piece of his 
master’s property—namely, himself. 
E. Objections 
We cannot end this discussion without considering, and then disposing of, 
a series of objections to our thesis. 
1. Rothbard 
According to Rothbard: 
  In contemporary America, outside the glaring exception of the armed 
forces, everyone has the right to quit his job regardless of whatever promise or 
“contract” he had previously incurred. Unfortunately, however, the courts, 
while refusing to compel specific personal performance of an employee 
agreement (in short, refusing to enslave the worker) do prohibit the worker 
from working at a similar task for another employer for the term of the 
agreement. If someone has signed an agreement to work as an engineer for 
ARAMCO for five years, and he then quits the job, he is prohibited by the 
courts from working for a similar employer for the remainder of the five years. 
It should now be clear that this prohibited employment is only one step 
removed from direct compulsory slavery, and that it should be completely 
impermissible in a libertarian society. 
  Have the employers, then, no recourse against the mind changer? Of 
course they do. They can, if they wish, voluntarily agree to blacklist the errant 
worker, and refuse to employ him. That is perfectly within their rights in a free 
society; what is not within their rights is to use violence to prevent him from 
working voluntarily for someone else. One more recourse would be 
 
different than the one that existed in the United States before the War of 1861. In that latter case, 
coercive slavery was the order of the day. Innocent people were seized, kidnapped, bound, 
whipped, and killed in the complete absence of any agreement to be treated in so vicious a 
manner on their part. That type of slavery is not at issue in the present paper. All libertarians, 
even all non-libertarians of good will, would have nothing but revulsion and disgust for such an 
institution. Here we are discussing something quite different: voluntary slavery. 
 30. He did so, I repeat, in order to save his son’s life, for those of you who have not been 
paying close attention to this little story. 
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permissible. Suppose that Smith, when making his agreement for lifelong 
voluntary obedience to the Jones Corporation, receives in exchange $1,000,000 
in payment for these expected future services. Clearly, then, the Jones 
Corporation had transferred title to the $1,000,000 not absolutely, but 
conditionally on his performance of lifelong service. Smith has the absolute 
right to change his mind, but he no longer has the right to keep the $1,000,000. 
If he does so, he is a thief of the Jones Corporation’s property; he must, 
therefore, be forced to return the $1,000,000 plus interest. For, of course, the 
title to the money was, and remains, alienable. 
  Let us take a seemingly more difficult case. Suppose that a celebrated 
movie actor agrees to appear at a certain theater at a certain date. For whatever 
reason, he fails to appear. Should he be forced to appear at that or at some 
future date? Certainly not, for that would be compulsory slavery. Should he be 
forced, at least, to recompense the theater owners for the publicity and other 
expenses incurred by the theater owners in anticipation of his appearance? No 
again, for his agreement was a mere promise concerning his inalienable will, 
which he has the right to change at any time. Put another way, since the movie 
actor has not yet received any of the theater owners’ property, he has 
committed no theft against the owners (or against anyone else), and therefore 
he cannot be forced to pay damages. The fact that the theater owners may have 
made considerable plans and investments on the expectation that the actor 
would keep the agreement may be unfortunate for the owners, but that is their 
proper risk. The theater owners should not expect the actor to be forced to pay 
for their lack of foresight and poor entrepreneurship. The owners pay the 
penalty for placing too much confidence in the actor. It may be considered 
more moral to keep promises than to break them, but any coercive 
enforcement of such a moral code, since it goes beyond the prohibition of theft 
or assault, is itself an invasion of the property rights of the movie actor and 
therefore impermissible in the libertarian society. 
  Again, of course, if the actor received an advance payment from the theater 
owners, then his keeping the money while not fulfilling his part of the contract 
would be an implicit theft against the owners, and therefore the actor must be 
forced to return the money.31 
I disagree with Rothbard about non-compete clauses. The ARAMCO engineer, 
presumably, was paid more for signing this contract that would otherwise have 
been the case, assuming ceteris paribus conditions. Rothbard might assent to 
forcing this employee to return these additional wages if he works elsewhere 
during that half decade time period. But, according to the contract they signed, 
the worker no longer owns the option to be employed elsewhere for this 
duration. If he wants this right returned to him, he must purchase ARAMCO’s 
permission. This was a done deal. There should be no “backsies” in the law. If 
 
 31. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 137–38 (New York Univ. Press 1998) 
(1982), available at http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics.pdf (citations omitted). 
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I purchase a newspaper for a dollar, I should not be able to return this item and 
get my money back unless the vendor agrees to this second deal. Why it 
should be any different in labor contracts is difficult for me to see. 
What about recourse against the “mind-changer?” Rothbard is of course 
correct in all the options he mentions. But why not one additional one? That is, 
compelling the reneger to live up to the stipulations in the contract: every last 
jot and tittle of them. We commonly do that for the purchaser of the 
newspaper; why not in all cases? 
The celebrated movie actor is not really a much more difficult case. The 
challenge to Rothbard’s non-alienability hypothesis is the tightrope walker 
who can plunge to his death when the safety net is removed out from under 
him by a fickle employee. But we have already dealt with that one. 
2. People will take advantage of alienability and increasingly engage in 
kidnapping (real slavery) 
Perhaps, maybe, who knows, it might come to pass. We have had very 
little experience with this sort of thing, so we cannot know whether and to 
what degree this is likely to be true. There are, nowadays, cases of kidnapping 
in the more benighted parts of the world. This crime has probably always 
existed, and may well, unfortunately continue. We have never had full 
alienability. But this is really irrelevant to the more important deontological 
issue of whether or not alienability is justified, apart from its utilitarian aspects, 
such as, possibly, this one. 
3. It is impossible to alienate the will 
The will, schmill. Voluntary slavery is orthogonal to the will, or lack of 
same. It is solely a matter of whether or not what would otherwise be 
considered assault and battery, rape, or murder would still be viewed in this 
way in the face of an agreed upon contract that legitimizes such (otherwise) 
execrable behavior. 
4. Illegal Acts 
Suppose the slave master orders the (voluntary) slave to do something 
illegal, such as rob, rape, or murder an innocent person. Is the slave obligated 
to do such heinous things? No, of course not. The owner may not properly 
compel the slave to do anything on this order that he himself would be 
precluded from doing by law. If it is illegal for the slave owner, say, to bite 
someone, it would be illicit also for him to order his slave, or his dog, to do so. 
F. Conclusion 
We have made what would appear to be on the surface merely a utilitarian 
case for alienability. With inalienability, things would go worse for the 
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alcoholic, for the tightrope walker, and for the father. If alienability is legal, 
then these three can have what they desire most: freedom from alcoholism, 
safety in tightrope walking, and the life of his son preserved. But, actually, the 
argument goes far deeper than that. Not only is alienability to be preferred on 
utilitarian grounds, the deontological case for it, too, is very powerful.32 The 
point is, if you cannot sell something or give it away, then there is a strong 
sense in which you do not own it in the first place.33 
Does this mean that all contracts, voluntarily entered into, should be 
upheld by law? No, at least not on libertarian grounds. A contract between X 
and Y to murder innocent person Z would be invalid, since it violates a 
libertarian basic premise, the Non-Aggression Principle.34 Some contracts are 
invalid on their face since they contravene the laws of logic. For example, no 
one may sell anyone else a square circle. This is a contradiction in terms. Nor 
may pink elephants, nor yet unicorns, be subjects of commercial interaction, 
since as a matter of fact such creatures do not exist.35 
 
 32. See Walter Block, Alienability, Inalienability, Paternalism and the Law: Reply to 
Kronman, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 351 (2001); Walter Block, Alienability: Rejoinder to Kuflik, 23 
HUMANOMICS 117 (2007); Walter Block, Epstein on Alienation: A Rejoinder, 33 INT’L J. SOC. 
ECON. 241 (2006); Walter Block, Market Inalienability Once Again: Reply to Radin, 22 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 37 (1999); Walter Block, Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A 
Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Smith, Kinsella, Gordon, and Epstein, 17 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 
39 (2003); Walter Block, On “Baby Selling”, LIBERTARIAN REV., Jan. 1979, at 41 (reviewing 
NANCY C. BAKER, BABY SELLING: THE SCANDAL OF BLACK MARKET ADOPTIONS (1978)); 
Walter Block, Are Alienability and the Apriori of Argument Logically Incompatible?, DIALOGUE 
(Apr. 2004), http://www.unisvishtov.bg/dialog/2004/256gord6.pdf. 
 33. States Malcolm: “On one walk he ‘gave’ to me each tree that we passed, with the 
reservation that I was not to cut it down or do anything to it, or prevent the previous owners from 
doing anything to it: with those reservations it was henceforth mine.” NORMAN MALCOLM, 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: A MEMOIR 31–32 (1958). 
 34. Walter E. Block, The Non-Aggression Axiom of Libertarianism, LEW ROCKWELL (Feb. 
17, 2003), http://www.lewrockwell.com/2003/02/walter-block/turning-their-coats-for-the-state/. 
 35. For libertarian critiques of fractional reserve banking contracts, mentioning the specifics 
of which would take us too far afield, see JŐRG GUIDO HÜLSMANN, THE ETHICS OF MONEY 
PRODUCTION (2008); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE CASE FOR A 100 PERCENT GOLD DOLLAR 
(Mises Inst. 1991); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE LOGIC OF ACTION I: METHOD, MONEY, AND 
THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 364–84 (1997); Philipp Bagus, David Howden & Walter Block, 
Deposits, Loans and Banking: Clarifying the Debate, 72 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 627 (2013); 
William Barnett, II & Walter E. Block, Crash and Carry: Financial Intermediaries, the 
Intertemporal-Carry Trade, and Austrian Business Cycles, 11 ETHICS & POL. 455 (2009); 
William Barnett, II & Walter Block, In Defense of Fiduciary Media—A Comment; or, What’s 
Wrong with “Clown” or Play Money?, 8 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 55 (2005); William Barnett, II & 
Walter E. Block, Time Deposits, Dimensions, and Fraud, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 711 (2009); Walter 
Block & Kenneth M. Garschina, Hayek, Business Cycles and Fractional Reserve Banking: 
Continuing the De-Homogenization Process, 9 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 77 (1996); Walter Block 
& Laura Davidson, The Case Against Fiduciary Media: Ethics Is The Key, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 505 
(2011); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jörg Guido Hülsmann & Walter Block, Against Fiduciary Media, 
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III.  PROFESSOR LEVY ON THE REAL BLACKMAIL PARADOX: A RESPONSE36 
Those of us among whom Ken Levy calls the “significant minority of 
scholars” who think that blackmail ought to be legal have reason to be grateful 
to him for his important and provocative recent article on the real paradox of 
blackmail.37 He acknowledges that “there are some very good arguments . . . 
that lead to . . . the conclusion that blackmail threats should be perfectly 
legal,”38 and he carefully sets forward no less than six of these. 
He has not in this acknowledgment joined the “significant minority”—far 
from it. Quite the contrary, the “very good arguments” in his view fall victim 
to even better refutations. Levy discusses these arguments in the context of 
what he calls the “real Blackmail Paradox.”39 As he sees matters, a paradox in 
philosophy normally opposes intuition and argument.40 We strongly believe, 
for example, that motion exists, but well-known arguments that stem from 
Zeno seem to show that motion is impossible. Precisely this opposition is 
found in blackmail: “On the one hand, we tend to think that blackmail threats 
are rightly criminalized”;41 but on the other hand, the six “very good 
arguments” threaten to undermine the intuition that supports criminalization. 
 
1 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 19 (1998); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, How is Fiat Money Possible?—Or, 
The Devolution of Money and Credit, 7 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 49 (1994); Jesús Huerta de Soto, 
A Critical Analysis of Central Banks and Fractional-Reserve Free Banking from the Austrian 
School Perspective, 8 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 25 (1995); Jesús Huerta de Soto, A Critical Note on 
Fractional Reserve Free Banking, 1 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 25 (1998); Jőrg Guido Hülsmann, 
Free Banking and Fractional Reserves: Reply to Pascal Salin, 1 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 67 
(1998); Jörg Guido Hülsmann, Free Banking and the Free Bankers, 9 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 3 
(1996); Jörg Guido Hülsmann, Has Fractional-Reserve Banking Really Passed the Market Test?, 
7 INDEP. REV. 399 (2003); Murray N. Rothbard, The Myth of Free Banking in Scotland, 2 REV. 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 229 (1988); Philipp Bagus, The Commons and the Tragedy of Banking, MISES 
DAILY (Nov. 12, 2003), http://mises.org/story/1373; Tony Baxendale, Free Banking, the Balance 
Sheet and Contract Law Approach, THE COBDEN CENTRE (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.cobden 
centre.org/2010/03/free-banking-the-balance-sheet-and-contract-law-approach/; Laura Davidson, 
Fractional Reserve Banking Is Indeed Fraudulent, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/2008/11/laura-davidson/fractional-reserve-banking-is-indeedfraudu 
lent/; Robert P. Murphy, The Fractional-Reserve Banking Question, MISES DAILY (June 14, 
2010), http://mises.org/daily/4499; Gary North, What Is Money? Part 5: Fractional Reserve 
Banking, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Oct. 10, 2009), http://www.lewrockwell.com/2009/10/gary-
north/fractional-reserves/. 
 36. This section is co-authored with David Gordon, Ph.D., senior fellow at the Ludwig von 
Mises Institute. 
 37. Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail Paradox: The Common Link Between 
Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (2007). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1057. 
 41. Id. at 1058. 
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Levy’s resolution to his paradox is straightforward. As we have already 
suggested, he maintains that the arguments in favor of legalization fail. He thus 
leaves us with nothing to oppose the intuition that blackmail threats should be 
illegal, and the paradox thus dissolves. We shall endeavor to show that Levy 
has not succeeded in refuting the arguments for legalization that he discusses. 
If we are right, then the situation for him will be one of a paradox regained: he 
still will face the problem of reconciling intuition and argument. We confront 
no such daunting task, though, because we reject the intuition in favor of 
criminalization. We can happily accept the “very good arguments” as they 
stand.42 
Levy confines his analysis of blackmail threats to one type of case, and we 
shall follow him in this limitation. He is concerned only with threats to 
disclose embarrassing information that is non-criminal.43 Levy thinks that the 
case for criminalizing blackmail threats to disclose criminal behavior presents 
no difficulty: “[T]he remainder of this [Levy’s] Article will . . . focus entirely 
on what is the much harder problem—the question why blackmail threats to 
disclose embarrassing information should also be criminalized.”44 The 
disclosure that is threatened is not itself illegal: it is not a crime to publish 
embarrassing information. Blackmail threats must be distinguished from 
extortionate threats, which involve either illegal actions or the use of illegal 
means to perform a legal act.45 
 
 42. Levy’s use of the term “paradox” differs in one way from its usual use in the 
philosophical literature. Genuine paradoxes present arguments that are very difficult to defeat: the 
examples that Levy mentions, Zeno’s paradoxes of motion and the Surprise Exam paradox, are 
cases in point. Levy, supra note 37, at 1057 n.10. Even if one thinks that there is a resolution of 
these paradoxes, this is achieved only with great difficulty and something of the initial 
puzzlement remains. But, by his own lights, he dispatches the pro-blackmail arguments with little 
fuss. If he is correct in his refutations, not much is left of the initial paradox. His argument then 
would be better taken as showing that the “real paradox of blackmail” is not a real paradox. If we 
are correct that his refutations fail, we have given him back his paradox. 
 43. A sees B rob a store. A blackmails B about that. That is an example of blackmail based 
on a criminal act. C observes D cheating on his wife. C blackmails D on that basis. That is an 
example of blackmail based on a non-criminal act. 
 44. Levy, supra note 37, at 1069. We do not agree with Levy that blackmail threats to 
disclose illegal behavior should be illegal, much less that the case for this view is easy to make, 
but we will not pursue the matter here. 
 45. Id. at 1070. We here paraphrase Levy. The definition of “coerce” that he offers in his 
account of extortion appears mistaken. He says, “[b]y coerce, I [Levy] mean presenting a target 
with the option of either performing a certain action or facing a highly probable risk of being 
subjected to what the coercer correctly believes the target will perceive as a harm.” Id. at 1071 
n.42. Suppose that someone is afloat on a small plank of wood in the ocean. A rescuer in a 
helicopter lowers a life preserver to him. If he does not put on the life preserver, he will drown; 
but it would be wrong to say that he has been coerced to don the life preserver. If it is objected 
that the harm must worsen the situation from what it would have been absent the action of the 
intervener, we can readily modify the example. Suppose lowering the life preserver knocks away 
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After he clarifies the blackmail situation with which he is concerned, Levy 
proceeds to state six arguments that support legalizing blackmail.46 He follows 
this with his response to each argument.47 Rather than follow his procedure 
step-by-step, we shall advance at once to what he takes to be his “[c]entral 
argument.”48 The supporter of legalization claims that when the blackmailer 
tells his victim that he will disclose embarrassing information unless the victim 
makes it worth his while not to do so, he does not violate the victim’s rights.49 
People do not have a right to have embarrassing information suppressed. If the 
blackmailer had published his material instead of offering to conceal it for pay, 
the embarrassed subject of the publicity would be without legal recourse. Why 
then should the blackmailer face a legal ban on his activities? 
Levy replies that our reputation is among our supreme interests. 
The criminal law is largely concerned with protecting people against 
deliberately inflicted harm to our supremely valued interests, to the interests 
that they generally most highly value—namely life, physical well-being, 
emotional well-being, family, liberty, and property. . . . 
  The fact that emotional well-being is among the supremely valued interests 
explains why we have criminal laws against menacing, harassment, and 
stalking . . . . These laws are all designed to protect people, in one way or 
another, from undue fear and anxiety. As it turns out, for the same reason, 
there should be laws against threats to reputation. For, like emotional well-
being, reputation is also a supremely valued interest. Its owners tend to value it 
just as much as, if not more than, any of the other supremely valued interests 
(life, physical well-being, etc.) So threats to it are just as likely to inflict the 
same level of fear and anxiety as extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, 
and stalking. And, if this likely consequence is sufficient to criminalize these 
latter kinds of threats, then it is also sufficient to criminalize the former kind of 
threats—i.e., blackmail threats.50 
 
the plank of wood, so that the person on it must don the preserver or immediately drown. It still 
seems odd to claim that he has been coerced. 
 46. The six are as follows: (1) Legal threatened action entails legal threat; (2) Blackmail 
threats are not attempted theft; (3) Blackmail threats belong to the family of legally permissible 
threats; (4) Blackmail constitutes an ordinary economic transaction; (5) Legalization would help 
to make blackmail targets better off; (6) If target-initiated blackmail is legal, then blackmailer-
initiated blackmail should also be legal. Id. at 1064–65. 
 47. Id. at 1079–95. 
 48. Id. at 1080. 
 49. Levy does not note that you can blackmail someone by threatening to disclose 
embarrassing information about someone else. Suppose, for example, that you threaten to 
disclose that my wife listens to Lawrence Welk. I do not want her lack of musical taste to become 
known, so I pay you to keep this to yourself. This counts as blackmail of me, not my wife. 
 50. Levy, supra note 37, at 1065. 
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Levy’s argument, in sum, is that the threat to our supremely valued interest of 
reputation posed by blackmail generates a high level of fear and anxiety, to 
which the law may appropriately respond by banning blackmail threats; but the 
connection between the blackmail threat and fear and anxiety is less direct than 
Levy surmises. Suppose that I value highly my reputation for religious 
orthodoxy, and someone threatens to expose my failure on a particular 
occasion to observe my religion’s strict standards. When the blackmailer 
informs me of his demands, will I feel fearful and anxious? It is not clear why I 
would. No doubt I should prefer that my misstep had remained undiscovered, 
and, failing that, that my interlocutor had tactfully kept his damning knowledge 
to himself. But why would I be fearful or anxious? I would probably be angry 
that I had been put into the position of having to buy silence; but so long as I 
thought he would keep his bargain, what have I to fear? By hypothesis, I value 
my reputation and might be fearful of efforts to damage it; but what I have 
secured by paying his price is precisely his silence. My reputation remains 
intact to everyone except him. 
Further, the extent to which a threat to reveal embarrassing information 
induces fear and anxiety often is subject to the control of the threat’s recipient. 
If someone tries to blackmail you, you do not have to suffer embarrassment at 
the prospect of exposure; you may be able to meet the situation with 
indifference. Perhaps you think that your reputation will survive the knowledge 
of your sins. When someone threatened to expose the Duke of Wellington’s 
relationship with the courtesan Harriette Wilson, the Duke answered, “Publish 
and be damned”!51 President Clinton did not appear much disconcerted by the 
publicity surrounding his romantic adventures. If one is free to disarm a 
blackmailer’s threat by not reacting as he hopes, why should one receive legal 
protection as well?52 Suppose someone contends that advertisements for luxury 
goods should be banned because they induce unhappiness in those unable to 
afford these products. Is not the appropriate response that the person upset by 
these advertisements should try to modify his feelings? Admittedly, both here 
and in the blackmail cases, one’s responses are not always under one’s control, 
but to the extent they are, the case for legal action is weakened. 
We also readily admit that other aspects of the situation could induce fear 
and anxiety. I might think that the blackmailer will not be satisfied with his 
initial demand and worry that he may continually come back for more money. 
Even if he does not ask for additional payments, can I be sure that he will 
maintain his silence? What if he takes my money and discloses my misstep 
 
 51. Brian Cathcart, Rear Window: When Wellington Said Publish and Be Damned: The 
Field Marshal and the Scarlet Woman, THE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 20, 1994), http://www.indepen 
dent.co.uk/voices/rear-window-when-wellington-said-publish-and-be-damned-the-field-marshal-
and-the-scarlet-woman-1430412.html. 
 52. We owe this point to Terrance Tomkow. 
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anyway? Further, I might be anxious because the blackmailer’s demand is so 
great that I doubt my ability to meet it. None of these circumstances, though, is 
essential to the blackmail demand, and the illegality of blackmail may serve to 
exacerbate rather than alleviate these sources of fear and anxiety. If, under a 
regime of legal blackmail, someone disclosed information after accepting 
payment for his silence, he could be sued. Not so under the present system, 
since one cannot sue for breach of an illegal contract. 
More importantly, if people are as fearful and anxious over their 
reputations as Levy thinks, then it is the disclosure of damaging information, 
rather than its concealment, that is likely to upset them. But the illegality of 
blackmail makes it more likely that those who discover damaging information 
will disclose it: they risk criminal sanction if they attempt to exchange their 
silence for money. Will not this situation increase fear and anxiety? Levy 
responds to the argument that making blackmail illegal increases the chances 
of disclosure by saying that “it is speculative and therefore counter-balanced 
by equally speculative considerations.”53 But even if one finds persuasive the 
considerations he advances, the effects of legalizing blackmail on the level of 
fear and anxiety are at best uncertain. Levy has not given us reason to think 
that, on balance, legalizing blackmail would raise fear and anxiety. 
The crucial issue, as we see it, is this. Levy maintains that people are owed 
protection against harm to their supremely valued interests and that reputation 
counts among these interests. But, given the scope of the right to one’s 
reputation as he conceives it, he is unable to show that the threat of blackmail 
counts as a harm. To state one’s intention to disclose embarrassing information 
may very well induce fear and anxiety and so cause harm (though if we are 
right, it need not); but to do so is not illegal. Neither is it illegal to disclose 
embarrassing information. What then is the extra harm that stating an intention 
to disclose embarrassing information, conditional on not paying blackmail, 
adds? Levy maintains that the fact that it is legal to disclose embarrassing 
information leaves intact his claim that reputation ranks among our supreme 
interests: the fact that free speech overrides reputation does not demonstrate 
that reputation falls outside our supreme interests. We need not challenge him 
here. The point is that, given that free speech trumps reputation in the way 
Levy indicates, he cannot show any distinctive harm to reputation generated by 
blackmail beyond legally-permitted acts. 
To reiterate, our challenge to Levy is not to his claim that people should 
have a legally- protected interest in their reputation. In our libertarian view, 
people do not have reputation rights: your reputation is what other people think 
of you, a matter over which you have no jurisdiction. Levy is right that people 
are interested in their reputations, but not every interest, or even every 
 
 53. Levy, supra note 37, at 1094. 
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supremely important interest, generates a right.54 People generally have very 
strong interests in having a large bank account, maintaining good health, and 
enjoying satisfying relationships with their families and friends, but it does not 
follow that they have rights to any of these things. But even if one accepts 
Levy’s account of a right to reputation, he has failed to justify prohibiting 
blackmail. 
Again, our challenge to Levy does not depend on rejecting a general right 
to be protected against undue fear and anxiety. Once more, even if one accepts 
his views about protection from fear and anxiety, this does not offer sufficient 
reason to prohibit blackmail. Nevertheless, the topic is important, and we do in 
fact dissent from his position. 
Why should one think that there is a general right to be protected against 
serious fear and anxiety?55 Is it not the case that “[a]lmost any change is 
potentially anxiety-producing, and a policy of anxiety reduction would be a 
prescription for maintaining the status quo”?56 If so, why should the fact, if it is 
one, that blackmail causes fear offer a ground to prohibit it? In defense of his 
view that it does offer such a ground, Levy launches a counterattack: If 
Block’s argument worked, “then extortionate threats, menacing, harassment, 
and stalking should not be criminalized. For, again, the main reason why these 
kinds of acts are criminalized is because they tend to cause especially high 
levels of fear and anxiety. Yet they clearly should be criminalized.”57 
This counterattack fails. These acts that Levy mentions often involve 
threats to violate rights. If, for example, someone approaches you, takes out a 
gun, and points to it while he glares at you, you have good reason to think he 
may shoot you. We would without difficulty acknowledge that such behavior 
ought to be illegal. It is only when there exists no threat to violate rights that 
we would throw into question the legality of prohibition. To reject a general 
right to protection against fear and anxiety is not at all to allow unlimited 
menacing, harassment, and stalking, contrary to Levy’s claim about Block’s 
argument. 
 
 54. An influential theory of rights defines “rights” in terms of “interests.” See, e.g., Matthew 
H. Kramer, Introduction to MATTHEW H. KRAMER, N.E. SIMMONDS & HILLEL STEINER, A 
DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 1, 1–2 (1998). But it does not follow from 
this account that every important interest creates a right. 
 55. Levy thinks that “[t]he mere fact that a particular (kind of) action causes serious fear and 
anxiety does not by itself warrant the conclusion that it should be criminalized . . . the action must 
also not have a sufficiently counter-balancing moral or institutional justification.” Levy, supra 
note 37, at 1095 n.119. But it is evident that he would extend protection against fear and anxiety 
to many more cases than we would. 
 56. Id. at 1086 (quoting Walter Block, Replies to Levin and Kipnis, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 
23, 23 (1986)). 
 57. Levy, supra note 37, at 1086. 
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If we are correct, Levy’s central argument fails, but several other claims 
that he makes also seem open to challenge. We have already commented on 
Levy’s claim that it is “speculative” that legalizing blackmail would make 
people better off by giving targets of blackmail a chance to avoid exposure if 
they were willing to pay the price. Levy adduces against this speculative 
considerations aimed to show that legalization would increase the number of 
people threatened with blackmail. Even if he is right, it is still the case that his 
favored policy imposes a burden on those denied a chance to purchase silence. 
They must, at least in some cases, put up with exposure in order to help secure, 
on admittedly speculative grounds, fewer blackmail threats overall.58 The 
circumstance is analogous to a law that would impose criminal penalties for 
payment of ransom demands. Such laws might well reduce the number of 
kidnappings for profit, but they would impose a severe cost on the families of 
those who had been kidnapped. They would face a much higher risk of the 
death of the victim than would be the case were paying ransom legal. 
Levy, in response to the argument that blackmail is an ordinary economic 
transaction, lists a large number of distinctions between blackmail and other 
economic transactions, but a number of his items are questionable. He says, for 
example, that in a legitimate business transaction, the seller is offering to 
abstain “from some profit or advantage which he might legitimately enjoy,”59 
but the common blackmailer abstains from no such advantage. This is not so; a 
blackmailer may be surrendering the profit he would have earned from selling 
his information. It is not the case that blackmailers always threaten to exercise 
“immoral liberties,” that is, legal actions that are morally wrong.60 Publicizing 
damaging material about someone is in many circumstances not morally 
wrong. Further, many ordinary economic transactions involve, at least 
arguably, immoral liberties—for example, selling pornography, writing for-
profit political propaganda that one deems grossly mistaken, etc. Further, many 
ordinary transactions, not just blackmail, are intended to harm the target.61 
Suppose, for example, that you install a garish statue on your front lawn in the 
hope that your aesthetically sensitive neighbor will pay you to remove it. It is 
not clear how the blackmail proposal requires the victim “‘to choose between 
two of her rights.”62 You do not have a right to be free from exposure: that 
precisely is why blackmail is not extortion. 
 
 58. And this is putting aside the possibility that the lowered cost of blackmail to the 
blackmailer, if it were legal, would reduce the number of occasions of blackmail. Levy 
acknowledges that his “speculative considerations” are counterbalances for the effect just 
mentioned. Id. at 1094. 
 59. Id. at 1090. 
 60. Id. at 1093. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Levy, supra note 37, at 1093. 
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We take particular interest in Levy’s criticism of the argument that legal 
threatened action entails legal threat because he concentrates his fire against an 
earlier paper of our own. The sentence in our paper to which he refers is this: 
“If a person has the right to do X, he necessarily has the right to give warning 
of the fact that he will do or may do X—that is, to threaten to do X.”63 On 
further consideration, we think that this is slightly too strong. It is not that an 
illegal threat with no corresponding illegal action is a logical or metaphysical 
impossibility; rather, the illegality of an action is a criterion, in Wittgenstein’s 
sense, for the illegality of the threat to perform the action.64 Exceptions are not 
ruled out a priori, but they are conceptually odd. 
Levy offers two criticisms. First, it is not clear why we hold the principle 
just quoted “and not the converse—namely, that the legal status of the threat 
entails the legal status of the threatened action, in which case the illegality of 
blackmail threats rather than the legality of disclosure would be the starting 
point.”65 Two points in response: First, we do not hold the converse principle 
because this principle is false. It is, or may be, illegal to threaten to overthrow 
the government, but it is not illegal to overthrow it. If you succeed in doing 
that, the previous legal system lapses. More centrally, the conceptual 
dependence is that of threat on action, not the other way around. 
But this brings us to Levy’s second criticism. Is not our claim “less an 
argument than a stipulation”?66 Why not say, instead, that there is “simply a 
virtually, but not fully, exceptionless correlation between the legal statuses of 
threats and their threatened actions”?67 Here, we readily acknowledge that we 
have no other argument besides asking the reader to think about threats and see 
whether he agrees with us that a conceptual dependence is present rather than 
the mere correlation Levy mentions. If it is the latter, the correlation is quite a 
coincidence. 
In response to the objection that “if blackmailer-initiated blackmail is 
illegal, then target-initiated blackmail should be illegal as [w]ell,”68 Levy 
accepts the point. Target-initiated blackmail should be illegal. Here we applaud 
him for his willingness to accept the consequences of his position. We think 
that he ought to extend what he says further and recognize that making 
 
 63. Walter Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to 
Posner, Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 37, 38 (1985). 
 64. See STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 65–85 (1979); Rogers Albritton, On 
Wittgenstein’s Use of the Term “Criterion,” 56 J. PHIL. 845 (1959). 
 65. Levy, supra note 37, at 1080. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1095. 
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blackmail illegal should have more consequences for the legal system.69 
Specifically, if blackmail is illegal, then disclosing embarrassing information 
should also be illegal. We of course do not favor this change, but at least it is a 
coherent position. What we claim is not coherent is to hold that blackmail 
should be illegal because it is a harm to people’s interest in their reputations, 
accompanied by the view that free speech trumps the interest to reputation in a 
way that that renders the harm of the blackmail threat unintelligible. 
  
 
 69. There are signs in Levy’s article that he might view such further consequences with 
favor. He says, “it does not strain reason to think that society might very well have adopted the 
reverse judgment and made truthful but reputation-damaging disclosures illegal.” Id. at 1083. 
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